Washington has reassessed its approach to the Sudan war in recent days. According to an American diplomat, an internal review concluded that the power structure in Port Sudan has become the main factor prolonging the conflict.
He said the influence of Port Sudan commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is no longer tied to military strength, but to economic and administrative networks that manage essential resources and profit from the continuation of the war.
A new American reading
According to information obtained by media, Washington is now working on two parallel tracks. The first is identifying the financial networks that developed over the past two years around the port and its connected economic hubs. The second involves legal measures that would allow direct sanctions on figures who manage or benefit from these networks.
The source notes that these steps are not simply negotiation pressure, but an attempt to reduce the resources Burhan relies on to maintain his position inside Port Sudan.
US assessments also indicate that the military institution under Burhan’s command is increasingly weak in its ability to make independent decisions, and that civilian–military power circles in Port Sudan now prioritise economic considerations over political or security ones.
This blend of economics and warfare, according to Washington’s analysis, makes any negotiation path with the current leadership a dead end, because the actors controlling decision-making have no interest in halting military operations while their economic structures continue functioning in the absence of a central state.
Dismantling Port Sudan’s influence
Discussions in Washington include options that go beyond the current negotiation frameworks, including exploring a transitional phase without Port Sudan’s leadership at the forefront, with a prominent role for civilian figures capable of managing key cities and restoring public services.
On the ground, Washington treats Port Sudan as an operational command centre for the war, not just a government refuge. This drives US focus toward tools that limit the centre’s ability to control essential resources. The US is also studying restrictions on commercial activities linked to the port.
The notable shift in this assessment is the view that Burhan’s influence must be dismantled to reach a realistic ceasefire. Washington no longer sees the military leadership in Port Sudan as a partner capable of producing a settlement, but as part of the structural problem preventing the end of the war.
According to the diplomatic source, new steps targeting power networks in Port Sudan are expected in the coming period, as part of a more direct US policy to reorder the Sudanese landscape.
Burhan’s loss of public support
Sudanese researcher Alaa al-Deen Mohammed al-Siddiq told media that Burhan’s position has eroded significantly, not only because of weakened military influence but also because he has lost touch with the social environment, which has changed dramatically since the war began.
He argues that Port Sudan’s leadership no longer represents a national decision-making centre, but has become isolated from public sentiment and social shifts.
Mohammed says the Rapid Support Forces have practically dismantled the traditional structure of central authority, imposing a local governance model in several areas based on service provision, trade management and community security. These elements form the “pillars of stability” that Burhan’s leadership failed to provide.
He added that it is natural for Washington to take a pragmatic view of Sudan’s reality. Any upcoming US steps will rely on a realistic reading of power balances, and the American direction appears to be moving toward bypassing Burhan entirely, viewing him as the “remnant of a collapsing power centre” disconnected from the social realities on the ground.
A shift in the American vision
John Mark Hansen, a specialist in complex conflicts and state-building, told media that Washington’s view of Sudan changed once it became clear that the war is no longer a two-party conflict but a complete collapse of the national army concept. With that, there is no longer a meaningful basis for betting on Burhan in any transitional arrangement.
Hansen says one early international mistake was treating Burhan as a “negotiable actor”, while facts show he became a hostage to a broader fragmentation and no longer represents even the geographic space he claims to control.
Hansen explains that despite its controversies, the Rapid Support Forces maintained a coherent leadership structure, rebuilt a form of local authority in large areas through social, tribal and economic networks, and are now viewed by Washington as the actor most capable of imposing relative stability and most ready to enter a political process if a new negotiation framework emerges that denies Burhan the ability to veto Sudan’s future.
He adds that Washington recognises that a political solution requires an actor with real on-the-ground legitimacy, not symbolic representation of a collapsed state. For this reason, the US is quietly reshaping its approach to include the Rapid Support Forces as a central component, given their societal influence and more effective governance compared to what remains of Burhan’s institutions.
Hansen concludes that Washington cannot end the war without engaging directly with the actor that created the new military reality, and that ignoring this has prolonged the conflict.
