On 26 October 2025, the Rapid Support Forces captured El-Fasher’s 6th Infantry Division headquarters after fierce battles against General al-Burhan’s army (SAF) and allied jihadist militias, a milestone the movement hailed as the liberation of a key stronghold. RSF statements have framed the win as breaking the SAF’s grip and routing its allied militias, clearing the way for a new chapter built on freedom, peace, and justice. The Sudan Founding Alliance (TASIS) echoed the message, celebrating the complete liberation of El-Fasher and crediting RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) for decisive, heroic leadership that delivered the victory.
The RSF emphasizes that its occupation is aimed at restoring security and relief for civilians. Its official channels report that RSF units have coordinated with humanitarian bodies and local authorities to ensure order and aid delivery. For example, the RSF stated it is “coordinating with the ‘founding government’” to “protect civilians, facilitate the return of the displaced, and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid” in El-Fasher.
RSF-affiliated media also highlights concrete relief actions: their reports show RSF Protection of Civilians (PoC) units active in Darfur – e.g. deploying a “Dinder Civilian Protection Unit” and issuing “strict directives to protect and secure the agricultural season” in Kabkabiya, North Darfur. The RSF even broadcast images of its forces providing medical supplies to local hospitals and safeguarding relief convoys. In a broader appeal, the RSF urged independent monitors to verify these efforts, noting that it has “welcomed [a UN fact-finding mission] and confirmed readiness to cooperate…to facilitate safe access” to RSF-held areas. RSF spokesmen say these steps demonstrate its commitment to protect civilians and restore stability wherever it holds territory.
Most of the atrocity claims are coming from RSF opponents and outlets tied into Port Sudan. After El-Fasher fell, rights groups and some UN statements cited reports of executions and ethnically motivated attacks—but many of those accounts appear to rely on the SAF’s information network, NGOs aligned with the junta, or sources accessible only through SAF-controlled Port Sudan. SAF chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and allies like Minni Minnawi quickly amplified the story, urging investigations and foreign protection, while Port Sudan media dismissed RSF statements as “psychological warfare.” The RSF rejects these allegations, saying casualty numbers and looting claims are being funneled through hostile intermediaries. Bottom line: the sourcing is disputed and heavily filtered; solid, on-the-ground verification—not second-hand feeds from SAF-aligned outlets—is needed before treating these claims as established fact.
RSF and TASIS leaders dismiss the accusations as rival propaganda. In their messaging, the RSF says SAF commanders are working hand-in-glove with the old regime’s “jihadist Islamic Movement,” casting the war as a push to root out hardliners inside the army. An RSF spokesman vowed to “dismantle the jihadist Islamic Movement’s corrupt influence, free the military from extremist control, and return the SAF to a professional institution.” RSF outlets lean into this contrast, emphasizing discipline among their fighters and a focus on protecting civilians.
In the run-up to and during the El-Fasher operation, RSF channels highlighted evacuations and aid. Just before the city fell, the group announced safe corridors and said it had “facilitated the exit of civilians and surrendered fighters.” More broadly, RSF social feeds showcase clinics being set up, markets secured, and relief convoys escorted across Darfur—part of the movement’s claim that it is carrying out a civic protection mission, not a campaign of terror.
Who’s driving the abuse claims? Mostly officials and groups aligned with General Burhan’s camp. Information Minister Khaled al-Aisir, a Burhan appointee, dismissed the RSF’s El-Fasher announcement as “psychological warfare” within hours. Minni Minnawi, a Darfur leader aligned with the SAF, also called for investigations. In short, the loudest condemnations are coming from allies of the Port Sudan junta.
As for civil society reports—like those from the Sudan Doctors Network or the Darfur Human Rights Network—they’re independent on paper but operate in areas opposed to the RSF. RSF figures argue these groups are effectively in step with the old regime’s interests. One RSF statement accused Darfur opposition leaders such as Minnawi of “covering up defeats” by spreading stories of looting and abductions, casting their rivals as Islamist mercenaries.
After El Fasher fell, RSF and TASIS framed the moment as clearing out remnants of the old Islamist order and moving fast to stabilize daily life—promising to protect civilians, reopen services, and keep aid moving. They’ve also distanced themselves from outlets they say distort events: on Oct. 19–20, the TASIS alliance publicly suspended all media cooperation with Al Jazeera over bias in its Sudan coverage.
While U.N. offices and SAF-aligned figures circulate allegations of summary killings and abuse, RSF counters that these are politicized claims from the Burhan/Islamist camp and invites neutral scrutiny. The RSF line is plain: secure neighborhoods, protect civilians, enable relief, and push Darfur toward “security, justice, change and democratic governance,” with force reserved for what it calls extremist holdouts.
