An international diplomatic bloc seeking an inclusive political settlement in Sudan has rejected the existence of parallel governing structures while conducting its latest consultations almost entirely inside territory controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces, raising questions over how representative the emerging peace process can be.
The Quintet — comprising the African Union, United Nations, European Union, Arab League and Intergovernmental Authority on Development — concluded a three-day “Good Offices” mission to Khartoum on Thursday, saying it opposed parallel authorities and remained committed to Sudan’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.
The declaration represents a clear rejection of the Government of Peace and Unity established by the Sudan Founding Alliance, or TASIS, which controls significant territory through forces including the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North.
But the circumstances surrounding the Quintet’s visit have exposed an apparent contradiction in its approach.
While calling for a “credible and inclusive Sudanese-led and Sudanese-owned” process, the delegation travelled to SAF-controlled Khartoum and held meetings with army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, his deputy, Prime Minister Kamil Idris and senior officials operating under the Port Sudan authorities.
The delegation also met the Democratic Bloc and a committee established to prepare the conditions for what Burhan’s authorities describe as a nationwide Sudanese dialogue.
TASIS, meanwhile, remains outside that framework despite representing a major political and military camp in the conflict.
The alliance has previously boycotted Quintet consultations, arguing that peace efforts cannot be credible if they reinforce institutions controlled by one side of the war while excluding competing political forces. TASIS and the civilian Sumoud coalition both stayed away from Quintet consultations in August.
The tension is particularly significant because the Quintet itself acknowledged that there is “no military solution” to Sudan’s war and said any durable settlement must ultimately produce a democratic, civilian-led government.
Yet rejecting TASIS outright as a parallel structure without incorporating its political constituency into negotiations risks narrowing the process around institutions associated with SAF — one of the two principal military forces still fighting for control of the country.
The dispute also cuts directly into competing visions of Sudan’s future.
SAF and its allies portray the TASIS government as an attempt to institutionalise the country’s territorial division, particularly following the establishment of governing institutions in areas outside army control.
TASIS figures reject that characterisation.
In a September 9 commentary, TASIS-linked political figure Ahmed al-Tijani Sayed Ahmed argued that the alliance’s project should be understood not as a plan to partition Sudan but as an attempt to build a new political order based on unified civilian authority and the eventual creation of a single professional national army.
His intervention reflects a broader TASIS effort to counter claims that establishing a government outside SAF-controlled territory amounts to creating a separate state.
The political reality confronting international mediators is therefore increasingly difficult to ignore.
Sudan no longer has a single authority exercising effective control over the country. SAF dominates Khartoum, the east and much of northern and central Sudan, while forces aligned with TASIS exercise authority across large parts of Darfur and other contested regions.
Declaring one wartime administration legitimate enough to host an international political mission while dismissing the other as an unacceptable “parallel” structure does little to resolve that reality.
The Quintet said its Khartoum mission was intended to listen to actors on the ground and connect domestic initiatives with consultations taking place outside Sudan. It also stressed that a sustainable process must protect civilians, halt hostilities and eventually restore democratic civilian government.
Those objectives, however, will ultimately require engagement with forces exercising political and military power on both sides of the front lines.
Unless the international process finds a mechanism to include TASIS and other excluded actors without conferring automatic recognition on competing wartime governments, the Quintet risks reproducing the same political divisions it says it is trying to overcome.
The central question is therefore no longer simply whether Sudan should have two governments.
It is whether a peace process built primarily around one of them can realistically reunify the country.
