Sudan’s brutal internal conflict erupted in April 2023, pitting General al-Burhan’s army (SAF) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, evolved from a Darfur militia into an autonomous force integrated into the state before turning against the SAF.
The SAF, under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has drawn support from various militias – including Islamist-leaning groups – in its fight against the RSF. Both sides have been accused of grave abuses against civilians during the war, prompting international alarm.
The Sudan Times examines these alleged crimes in a neutral, fact-focused manner, with particular attention to abuses by the SAF and allied Islamist militias, and the role of propaganda in fueling the conflict.
The Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
The RSF is a powerful rebel force that has been battling the SAF for control of Sudan since April 2023. Originating from the notorious “Janjaweed” militias of Darfur, the RSF became a formal force during Omar al-Bashir’s regime and later sought greater autonomy.
In the current war, the RSF has positioned itself as an opponent of Sudan’s old Islamist military establishment. Allegations of abuses have followed the RSF. Human rights monitors have documented RSF attacks on civilians, including looting and violence during offensives and reprisals.
For example, after an SAF-aligned militia defected from the RSF in late 2024, RSF fighters retaliated with a wave of assaults on villages deemed loyal to that militia – committing atrocities against civilians. Such incidents underscore that RSF forces, like their adversaries, have engaged in unlawful violence.
However, descriptions of RSF-perpetrated atrocities are often less detailed in official reports than those of the SAF’s allies and crimes of jihadist militias are often attributed to RSF by SAF media.
The RSF leadership denies targeting civilians, but neutral observers note that both sides in the conflict have committed serious violations of humanitarian law.
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Allied Islamist Militias
In contrast to the RSF’s more centralized command, the SAF has leaned on a coalition of militias and former regime loyalists to bolster its ranks.
Many of these groups carry an Islamist or ultra-nationalist ideology and have been implicated in brutal abuses against civilians.
Among the most prominent are the Sudan Shield Forces (SSF) and the Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Battalion, both of which have been fighting alongside the SAF and stand accused of atrocities.
Sudan Shield Forces and the Tayba Village Massacre
The Sudan Shield Forces, led by militia commander Abu Aqla Kikel, are a tribal paramilitary group allied with the SAF.
Formed in 2022 and drawing fighters primarily from Arab communities in central Sudan, the SSF initially sided with the army when war broke out, then briefly switched allegiance to the RSF, before returning to the SAF camp in late 2024.
They quickly became key proxies for the SAF’s operations in Al-Jazirah (Gezira) state and elsewhere.
In January 2025, the Sudan Shield Forces carried out a deadly attack on the village of Tayba in Gezira, in what human rights investigators describe as a deliberate massacre of civilians. According to Human Rights Watch, SSF fighters “intentionally targeted civilians and their property” in Tayba on January 10.
The militia stormed the village in pickup trucks mounted with weapons, opening fire indiscriminately and setting homes ablaze. At least 26 people, including one child, were killed in the raid, and many others wounded. The attackers looted food supplies and livestock and torched numerous houses. These acts – the deliberate killing of unarmed villagers, arson, and pillage – constitute war crimes, and could amount to crimes against humanity, according to Human Rights Watch.
Witnesses from Tayba reported horrific scenes: armed men hunting door-to-door for any men or boys, shooting those they found, and even attacking mourners during funeral burials later that day. The assailants, described by survivors as mostly of Arab origin, allegedly shouted ethnic slurs like “you slave!” at their victims – indicating a racial dimension to the violence.
This Tayba massacre was not an isolated incident. It came amid a broader surge of attacks by SAF-aligned militias in regions that the SAF had recaptured from RSF control. Throughout Gezira state and neighboring areas, militias such as the Sudan Shield Forces and others linked to hardline Islamist networks struck villages perceived as sympathetic to the RSF.
These militias accused local communities of “collaborating” with the RSF and exacted collective punishment. Often the targets were communities of non-Arab ethnic groups (known as “Kanabi” in central Sudan) originally from Darfur or Kordofan who were suspected – solely due to their background – of siding with the RSF.
In Tayba and elsewhere, civilians bore the brunt of this retaliatory campaign, enduring killings, looting, and intimidation. Human Rights Watch and other observers have urged Sudan’s SAF junta-controlled government to investigate these abuses and hold the perpetrators accountable, including commanders of the Sudan Shield Forces. Thus far, there is little evidence of such accountability.
The Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Battalion
Another key pro-SAF force is the Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Battalion, an Islamist militia whose influence and brutality have drawn widespread attention. Named after a famed warrior companion of the Prophet Muhammad, the Al-Bara’ ibn Malik group frames itself in jihadist terms and is composed largely of Islamist hardliners.
The battalion is linked to the former regime’s Popular Defence Forces (PDF) – a Islamist paramilitary network from Omar al-Bashir’s era – now revived under the banner of “Popular Resistance” or so-called “Shadow Battalions”. With an estimated strength of up to 20,000 fighters as of 2025, it is considered one of the most organized Islamist fighting groups in Sudan’s current war.
Its members, mostly young men reportedly aged 20 to 35, are believed to have been mobilized by Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood and allied Islamist factions. The group has been actively fighting alongside the SAF since the war began and has entrenched itself in front-line battles around Khartoum and central Sudan.
While some SAF supporters hail them as devoted “Mujahideen” (holy warriors), multiple reports accuse the Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Battalion of targeting civilians and committing egregious abuses in the name of combating the RSF.
War Crimes Allegations: The Al-Bara’ ibn Malik fighters have been implicated in several bloody incidents. In one case, the RSF and other groups accused the battalion of massacring dozens of aid volunteers in the Halfaya area of Khartoum North.
According to these accounts – corroborated by some opposition activists – Al-Bara’ militiamen killed as many as 70 youth volunteers at a community soup kitchen in Halfaya, on suspicion that those volunteers were aiding the RSF’s civilian supporters. (Local “Emergency Response Rooms” had been organizing food aid during the conflict, and their workers increasingly became targets as the SAF saw any relief in RSF-held districts as treason.)
In another incident in late January 2025, fighters believed to be from the Al-Baraa Battalion were filmed reading out a list of names of local residents in Khartoum North and saying “zaili” – Arabic for “killed” – after each name. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated it was aware of at least 18 people killed in a single day (January 25, 2025) by SAF-affiliated fighters in that area.
These grim videos suggest the battalion may have been executing suspected RSF collaborators and openly boasting about it. Furthermore, dozens of videos circulated on social media in recent months showing severe abuse of detainees by Al-Bara’ militants. In one such video – referenced by rights monitors – armed men identified as Al-Bara’ members drag a captive through the streets with a rope and later execute him, accusing him of spying for the RSF.
Such acts of torture and summary execution underscore the militia’s reputation for vigilantism and extreme brutality. Human Rights Watch has explicitly accused the Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Battalion of war crimes for “targeting civilians during the SAF offensive in Gezira state”. The militia’s campaign often mirrors that of the Sudan Shield Forces: punishing civilians (sometimes based on ethnic or regional biases) under the pretext that they supported the RSF.
Islamist Ideology and Influence: The Al-Bara’ battalion’s roots and rhetoric reveal a strong Islamist ideological motivation. Analysts note that the group’s core emerged from Islamist “Popular Resistance” circles preparing for conflict soon after Sudan’s 2019 revolution, when the Bashir regime fell.
By 2023, as war loomed, they had cultivated links with Islamist-leaning officers in military intelligence and were ready to take up arms alongside the SAF. The very naming of the battalion after a historic Islamic martyr figure, and the Salafi-jihadist overtones (the group explicitly espouses Islamist and Salafi-jihadist ideology), illustrate how religion is used to rally fighters.
Many of these militiamen see the RSF as not just a political enemy but a religious or moral foe – often painting the RSF as “traitors” to Sudan or Islam. Indeed, the SAF’s ranks were deeply “Islamised” in the 1990s under Bashir, and that legacy persists: Islamist militias like Al-Bara’ act as force multipliers for the SAF with a zeal fueled by ideology.
Observers have described Al-Bara’ and similar units as some of “the most prepared, trained and heavily armed” Islamist fighters in Sudan. Notably, SAF generals have acknowledged these militias’ presence. In a rare comment, SAF commander Shams al-Din Kabbashi suggested in March 2024 that groups like the Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Battalion “need to be better controlled” by the SAF – a tacit admission of their often unchecked violence.
Despite their brutality, the army continues to deploy these fighters, who have helped it regain territory from the RSF. Locally, the militias inspire both fear and support: some pro-SAF civilians view them as protectors against the RSF, while many others are terrified of their harsh brand of vigilantism.
Other SAF-Allied Elements
Alongside the Sudan Shield Forces and Al-Bara’ Battalion, the SAF’s war effort has drawn in additional Islamist and tribal militias. For example, factions of the former Popular Defence Forces, often called “Shadow Battalions” today, have reactivated to fight the RSF. Tribal coalitions like the Darfur Joint Forces and other regional fighters have also joined SAF offensives.
These groups typically share a common trait: hostility toward the RSF and, in many cases, loyalty to Sudan’s old Islamist order or the SAF establishment. Reports indicate they too have been involved in violence against civilians. In central Sudan, local militias armed by the SAF reportedly participated in the looting and burning of villages alongside the larger SSF and Al-Bara’ units.
In the capital Khartoum, SAF-aligned plainclothes elements have been accused of assassinations and targeted killings of activists or volunteers perceived as siding with the RSF. The pattern across these disparate militias is consistent: as the SAF pushes into areas formerly held by the RSF, reprisals against the local population often follow.
Civilians face suspicion simply for having lived under RSF control, and Islamist-leaning fighters within the SAF coalition are quick to brand such people as “apostates” or “traitors.” This has led to a perilous situation for humanitarian workers, ethnic minorities, and others trapped between the warring sides.
Propaganda, Misinformation, and Islamist Influence
Propaganda and hate speech have amplified the brutality of Sudan’s conflict. Both sides engage in intense information wars, but SAF-aligned Islamist actors have stood out for incitement against perceived RSF sympathizers. Arabic-language social media pages and messaging groups supportive of the SAF often brand the RSF as a “mercenary” force or even use sectarian language, portraying RSF fighters as outsiders undermining Sudan’s Islamic identity.
According to interviews with relief workers, whenever the SAF recaptures a neighborhood, an online smear campaign tends to follow.
Anonymous Facebook posts and WhatsApp messages – written in Arabic and circulated in closed groups – will accuse specific residents or volunteers of being “RSF collaborators,” effectively painting targets on their backs. This propaganda has deadly real-world consequences: several aid volunteers in Khartoum were killed after such rumors spread labeling them traitors. Humanitarian organizations have noticed disinformation spikes accompanying the SAF’s advances, as pro-SAF propagandists seek to justify crackdowns by demonizing anyone who stayed in RSF-held areas.
On the other side, the RSF’s propaganda portrays the SAF as captives of Islamist extremists. RSF leaders claim they are fighting not just the regular army but an array of “jihadists” and loyalists of the former Islamist regime. To some extent, facts support this narrative: early in the war, the RSF captured Mohamed Ali al-Jazouli, a notorious hardline preacher who had openly called for jihad against the RSF.
Al-Jazouli is a known Islamist extremist and Islamic State sympathiser, and his arrest by the RSF in May 2023 lent credence to the RSF’s warnings about Islamist militias backing the army.
Furthermore, the RSF has pointed to groups like the Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Battalion as evidence that elements of ISIS or al-Qaeda-style ideology have entered the conflict on the SAF’s side. While the RSF undoubtedly uses such claims to rally international and domestic support, the presence of fighters espousing salafi-jihadist beliefs among SAF-aligned units is documented.
The SAF’s own propaganda, meanwhile, focuses on branding the RSF as “rebels” and “outlaws.” State media and SAF officials refer to RSF forces as “mutineers” who loot, rape, and destroy – blaming them for most civilian suffering in Khartoum.
The SAF regularly publishes videos of RSF atrocities or crimes (some verified, some possibly exaggerated) to bolster its cause. Islamist media outlets amplify this messaging, often with a religious tint – for instance, depicting the war as a fight to prevent Sudan’s fragmentation or to protect Islamic institutions from RSF “bandits.”
Notably, Islamist political figures from the old regime have re-emerged as vocal cheerleaders of the SAF. They frame the war in existential terms. One recurring theme in pro-SAF Islamist discourse is that a victory for Dagalo’s RSF would herald the return of secularism or foreign domination, whereas the SAF;s triumph would safeguard Sudan’s Islamic character.
Within Sudan, Friday sermons by certain hardline clerics echo SAF talking points, praising “our mujahideen” (in reference to militias like Al-Bara’) and condemning the RSF as “Khawarij” (a historic term for renegades). Although the RSF also disseminates propaganda, the user of emotive religious rhetoric has been especially pronounced on the SAF/Islamist side.
For example, Islamist militia leaders have reportedly vowed to disband their units once the “infidel” RSF is defeated – implying their only goal is a holy victory, not power. Such statements are aimed at legitimizing the militias’ role as patriots or zealots, rather than mere gunmen. The cumulative effect of these propaganda efforts has been to sharpen sectarian and ideological divides: communities seen as RSF-aligned are demonized as enemies of the faith or nation, fueling further violence by SAF-aligned fighters, while RSF supporters view the SAF as tools of an Islamist old guard.
Impact on Civilians and Calls for Accountability
Civilians have suffered immensely due to atrocities and propaganda-fueled hatred. In urban battlefields like Khartoum, many have been killed by indiscriminate shelling and gunfire. In recaptured zones, there is credible evidence that SAF-allied militias executed or persecuted civilians accused of disloyalty.
In rural villages, communities have been torn apart along ethnic lines – as seen in Gezira state, where Arab militias (backing SAF) attacked non-Arab villagers suspected of RSF ties. Humanitarian volunteers and medics, who should be protected, are instead treated with mistrust or outright hostility by military factions. The result is a climate of fear: many relief workers expect to be killed if discovered by the wrong side. Propaganda has further compounded this, by spreading false accusations and justifying violence.
International organizations and Sudanese human rights groups are increasingly sounding the alarm. Human Rights Watch, for instance, has urged Sudan’s authorities to “urgently investigate all reported abuses” and prosecute those responsible – explicitly naming commanders of groups like the Sudan Shield Forces.
The United Nations has similarly called for accountability over the growing list of atrocities, from massacres of villagers to killings of aid volunteers. There is also pressure to curb the incitement and hate speech. Observers warn that unchecked propaganda and the mobilization of Islamist extremists could push Sudan’s conflict into an even more genocidal phase. The specter of “jihadism” worries regional and global powers, who fear Sudan could become a new haven for extremist fighters under the cover of a conventional war.
Domestically, some voices within Sudan’s military establishment appear uneasy about the influence of Islamist hardliners – as evidenced by SAF Gen. Kabbashi’s remarks about the need to rein in militias. However, the immediate demands of war have so far outweighed these concerns, and militia leaders remain empowered.
The SAF and its allied militias, particularly Islamist-oriented groups like the Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Battalion and tribal fighters like the Sudan Shield Forces, have engaged in large-scale atrocities – from village massacres to targeted killings – often driven by ideological zeal or revenge. The propaganda war accompanying the fighting has inflamed tensions further, as Islamist and pro-SAF actors paint the struggle in existential terms and dehumanize their opponents.
The result is a highly polarized narrative: one that downplays any wrongdoing by the SAF side while exaggerating RSF atrocities, and vice versa, depending on the source.
Neutral, on-the-ground reporting indicates that civilian suffering is pervasive and indiscriminate, regardless of which faction holds an area. As Sudan’s war rages on into its second year, neutral observers stress the importance of documenting all abuses objectively and pushing for accountability. Ending the cycle of impunity – for SAF units and RSF fighters alike – is seen as crucial to stopping further atrocities.
Moreover, curbing the influence of extremist militias and hate propaganda will be essential for any future peace. Sudan’s conflict is not only a power struggle between two generals, but also a battle shaped by the legacy of an Islamist military state versus a rebel force born in the peripheries.
Any resolution will require addressing the crimes and ideologies that have driven this war – from the massacre in Tayba to the vigilantism in Khartoum’s streets – and ensuring that those responsible are brought to justice. Only then can Sudan hope to move past the current nightmare toward a stable, inclusive future.
