A decade after Omar al-Bashir’s troops blanketed Darfur with “toxic clouds,” accusations of chemical warfare have resurfaced—this time against the SAF commanded by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan as it battles the Rapid Support Forces in the civil war that erupted in April 2023.
Aid groups that once documented blister-agent burns on Darfuri civilians now report fresh chlorine- and mustard-gas attacks on new front lines, reviving fears that Sudan’s conflicts are again being fought with outlawed poisons.
In 2016, Amnesty International documented at least 30 suspected chemical attacks by SAF in Jebel Marra and estimated up to 250 deaths (including many children) from exposure. Victims’ symptoms – bloody vomiting, skin blistering and peeling – were consistent with mustard-type blister agents.
For example, one Amnesty investigator described images of children covered in lesions and blisters after bombing, and interviewees reported “the putrid and ‘unnatural’ smelling smoke” that corroded lungs and skin.
These Darfur attacks were widely reported by international media and human rights groups. Reuters, the BBC and Al Jazeera all recounted the Amnesty findings in late 2016, noting that two chemical weapons experts reviewed the evidence and “concluded that the evidence strongly suggested exposure to vesicants [blister agents], such as sulfur mustard, lewisite or nitrogen mustard”.
Amnesty’s investigators relied on dozens of witness interviews, medical reports and satellite imagery to corroborate dozens of attack sites. Bashir’s government, however, flatly denied the claims.
In the ongoing civil war (since April 2023) between General al-Burhan’s SAF and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), new chemical-weapons allegations have surfaced. In January 2025 the New York Times reported that U.S. officials believed SAF had used chlorine gas in at least two remote attacks on RSF positions.
This intelligence led on May 23, 2025 to an unprecedented U.S. determination: the State Department announced sanctions on Sudan after concluding that the SAF junta controlled-government “used chemical weapons” in 2024, in clear violation of the CWC.
Reuters and Al Jazeera both cited State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce’s statement that Khartoum had breached the treaty and must “cease all chemical weapons use”. (The official U.S. notice delivered to Congress under U.S. law did not publicly specify which agents were used or where, but media reports attribute the attacks to chlorine.)
In sum, Washington now regards the new Sudanese civil war as involving CW use by General al-Burhan’s army (SAF), and has restricted U.S. exports and credits to pressure compliance.
Other sources aligned with the RSF have made similar claims. For example, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N, part of the anti-SAF alliance) accused SAF of dropping mustard gas and lewisite on civilians in multiple regions, presenting videos of yellowish “chemical clouds” over farmland and lab tests showing arsenic (a component of lewisite) in environmental samples.
The RSF itself has released soil and water analyses from Darfur and Khartoum-area battlefields, which it said contained markers of toxic exposure (e.g. chlorine residue). These allegations mirror each other in alleging chemical attacks in North and South Darfur, Khartoum, Gezira and other states, often citing burned bodies and collapsed survivors as evidence.
General al-Burhan’s SAF has however categorically denies all such accusations. SAF spokesmen call the U.S. claims and rebel accusations “baseless” and “falsified.” Culture Minister Khalid al-Aiser dismissed the allegations as “political blackmail” with “no supporting evidence”, accusing foreign powers of double standards. In public statements the SAF and junta-controlled government insist they have not deployed any chemical weapons.
International Findings and Responses
Sudan is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) – having ratified it in 1999 – so any use of toxic munitions would breach its treaty obligations. The most systematic international review came in 2016, when OPCW officials publicly noted they were “aware” of Amnesty’s Darfur report and “shall certainly examine the reports and all other available relevant information”.
The OPCW’s initial assessment later reiterated that without further data it could not verify those allegations.
No OPCW fact-finding mission has been sent to Sudan to date, though Amnesty and others have urged such an inquiry.
More recently, global reactions have focused on accountability for alleged CW use. In May 2025, the United States formally declared Sudan non-compliant and imposed targeted sanctions, joining earlier sanctions on senior SAF generals for crimes including genocide.
U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that Sudan must “cease all chemical weapons use and uphold its obligations under the CWC”. Other Western governments (EU, UN member states) have supported pressuring Sudan over the chemical-weapons issue, even as they grapple with the broader humanitarian crisis.
The United Nations itself has not (so far) sent inspectors specifically to look for gas attacks in Sudan, but UN human rights experts and the UN Secretary-General have condemned the conflict’s atrocities in general and called for respect of international law. In response to both the Darfur and current allegations, advocacy groups continue to demand transparent, international investigations into each chemical-weapons claim – for example, Amnesty has urged OPCW member states to press Khartoum for access and answers.
Drone-or-arson blast at an SAF-aligned Baraa bin Malik Brigades warehouse in Omdurman ignited suspected mustard- and sarin-filled munitions, shrouding western Khartoum in yellow-brown smoke just days after Washington announced new chemical-weapons sanctions on Sudan; around 5,000 people have been treated for burns and respiratory damage, morgues report dozens of deaths despite gag orders, and the RSF, Tasees alliance and ex-PM Abdalla Hamdok are calling for an OPCW probe into alleged undeclared stockpiles in densely populated areas.
SAF’s reliance on Islamist brigades such as Baraa bin Malik means toxic agents are now guarded by fighters with jihadist ties. As the front lines shift, unsecured caches could be looted by ISIS-Sahel, Boko Haram, or al-Shabaab networks, reproducing the Libyan scenario where mustard precursors nearly fell to ISIS in 2016.
Proliferation Risks
A key concern is what happens if Sudan’s chemical stockpiles fall into the wrong hands. Even before the recent war, analysts warned that Sudan’s instability and jihadist links could turn it into a proliferation risk.
Some military and political leaders have longstanding ties to Islamist movements (the al-Bashir regime once hosted Osama bin Laden in the 1990s), and the Jamestown Foundation notes that “some elements of the SAF under General al-Burhan are believed to have close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamic State has already seen success in using Sudan as a recruiting and logistics hub”.
With parts of Sudan allied or infiltrated by extremists, any chemical-weapons arsenal is vulnerable.
This danger is illustrated by regional examples. After Libya’s 2011 collapse, UN-led teams raced to remove massive stocks of mustard-agent precursors from Gaddafi-era depots as ISIS fighters neared the site. Libyan officials warned that if ISIS had captured the chemicals, “it would be dangerous not [just] for us but for the international community”.
The same logic applies in Sudan, jihadist networks active in the Sahel, Horn and Middle East (from Boko Haram and al-Shabab to ISIS affiliates) could eagerly exploit any unguarded chemical agents. Sudan borders several fragile neighbors (Chad, CAR, Libya, South Sudan, Ethiopia) and sits at a crossroads of terrorist flows.
Even a limited proliferation (e.g. sales of mustard shells or chlorine canisters) could enable deadly attacks far beyond Sudan’s borders.
From Darfur’s vesicant attacks to the 2025 chlorine findings and the Omdurman warehouse disaster, the record shows a persistent SAF pattern: denial, no accountability, and storage of outlawed agents in populated zones.
Unless OPCW inspectors gain prompt access and Sudan’s arsenal is verifiably dismantled, the chemical weapons in the hands of General al-Burhan and his SAF will remain a grave threat—both to Sudanese civilians and to regional security if jihadist factions seize them.
