Since the 2011 Arab Spring, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its affiliates have mounted an extensive online influence operation across the Middle East and beyond. Riding the wave of Middle Eastern upheavals, the Brotherhood’s networks of activists and sympathizers used social media to amplify pro-Islamist messages and denigrate opponents.
In the Muslim-majority world they have openly backed regimes and movements aligned with their ideology (notably Turkey’s AKP government, Qatar, and Islamist parties in North Africa) while attacking hostile regimes (Egypt’s post-2013 government, the Gulf monarchies).
In the West, by contrast, Brotherhood-linked actors have often cloaked their agenda in the language of human rights or Islamophobia, working through community organizations and transnational networks to exert influence over policies and public discourse.
The Sudan Times traces the Brotherhood’s tactics since 2011, contrasting its propaganda strategies in the Arab world (installing or propping up friendly regimes) with its methods in Western democracies (using liberal ideals as cover for ideological goals).
We draw on academic analyses, investigative reports, and official disclosures to expose how MB-related disinformation campaigns have played out in Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, the UK and elsewhere.
From the Arab Spring to Today
The Muslim Brotherhood’s role exploded during and after the Arab Spring. In 2012 the Brotherhood won power in Egypt under President Mohamed Morsi, and influenced Islamist parties in Tunisia, Libya and beyond. Its activists were buoyed by popular uprisings against autocrats.
But by 2013–14, secularist counter-revolutions toppled Brotherhood-linked regimes (e.g. Morsi in Egypt) and Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE) moved to crush MB influence (designating it a terrorist group).
Many Brotherhood members fled or went underground, finding refuge in Turkey or Qatar. In this context of regional polarization, both the Brotherhood and its opponents turned to digital media as weapons of influence. A 2020 study of Egyptian Twitter activity, for example, found “warring disinformation campaigns” on both sides – the Sisi government’s supporters and anti-government activists alike used coordinated hashtags and botnets to appear more popular than they were.
The result has been a confusing online battlefield.
However, the Brotherhood’s own use of disinformation is notable for its scope and organization. A major Stanford Internet Observatory analysis (published late 2020) detailed an MB-linked network of dozens of Facebook pages, Instagram and Twitter accounts with nearly 1.5 million followers combined.
This network produced “hundreds of original videos and dozens of original songs”, portraying sympathetic narratives and polished imagery. Although the campaign strove to appear grassroots, investigators found it was very much coordinated – one node was even a social-media marketing firm in Egypt. “Professional branding” was a hallmark: the campaign’s pages had non-profit or newsy names (for example, “Hearts with Qatar” or “Tunisia Against the UAE”), and shared content attacking targets and praising friends.
In practice this meant lauding governments and rulers allied to the Brotherhood (for example, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Qatar’s emir, both of whom sheltered MB exiles), while denouncing their rivals. As the Stanford report summarizes, its “central messages included praise for the Muslim Brotherhood-supporting governments of Turkey and Qatar,” and harsh criticism of Saudi, Egyptian and UAE governments.
The Stanford research highlights the Brotherhood’s social-network manipulation: cross-platform operations blending real and fake accounts, run from multiple countries. For example, in late 2020 Facebook revealed it had dismantled a Brotherhood-related network operating out of Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco.
Facebook’s transparency report noted it took down “31 Facebook accounts, 25 Pages and two Instagram accounts… operated by individuals in Egypt, Turkey and Morocco associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. They targeted Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, Somalia and Saudi Arabia.”. In other words, at least one MAJOR disinformation campaign openly identified by the platform was indeed Brotherhood-linked.
In short, since the Arab Spring MB-sympathetic actors have run highly professional online influence operations in the Arab world: large networks of pages, videos, and posts promoting their agenda. They create multiple front pages (often posing as local NGOs or news outlets), post original content, and use multilingual channels (Arabic, Turkish, etc.) to reach audiences.
These accounts often trend under exaggerated hashtags (e.g. #IloveErdogan), boosting the appearance of grassroots support. Political music videos and fake news articles are common tools. The goal is to stabilize or restore friendly Islamists to power: praising Erdogan and Qatar’s support, applauding Islamist victories, and falsely depicting opponents as enemies of Islam.
In practice, the MB’s Middle Eastern propaganda network has largely supported two kinds of regimes:
- Authoritarian “friendly” regimes or movements – e.g. Turkey’s AKP under Erdogan, Qatar’s government, Islamist parties in Tunisia/Libya – all of which have sheltered Brotherhood figures. Brotherhood media in Turkey have explicitly campaigned for these governments and preached pro-Islamist ideology.
- Jihadist or Islamist causes – while the MB officially eschews violence, its ideological kin (like Hamas in Gaza, or Syria’s Islamist groups) share elements of its agenda. MB-run channels regularly show solidarity with Palestinians or other Islamist fighters, amplifying narratives of resistance. (For instance, one MB-linked campaign released content asserting that Egyptian security forces were “imprisoning and killing MB supporters” and that Islamist groups were under siege.)
By contrast, Egypt’s government (and its Gulf allies) have also run extensive disinformation campaigns of their own. An October 2020 analysis of Egyptian Twitter found that both sides were deploying inauthentic accounts. The authors note: “the largest sponsor of information manipulation continues to be the Egyptian government… [but] both anti-government and pro-government actors have used Twitter to spread warring disinformation campaigns”.
Egypt’s security services even met crackdowns on dissent by pumping pro-regime narratives online (for example hashtags like #SisiIsOurPresident). Thus, in Egypt there was a real “information war,” with the Brotherhood (and fellow opposition groups) and the state each using networks of bots, fake accounts, and coordinated posts to dominate the discourse.
Propaganda Tactics in Muslim-Majority Countries
In predominantly Muslim countries, the Brotherhood’s disinformation tactics are relatively overt and aggressive. They often serve to shore up or elect Islamist-friendly governments and parties. Notable examples:
- Turkey (Erdogan): After 2013 many Egyptian and regional MB figures relocated to Turkey, whose government largely sympathizes with the Brotherhood’s brand of political Islam. The MB has exploited this safe haven extensively. Research reports that several MB-affiliated TV channels (like Mekameleen, Elsharq, Watan TV and Channel 9) operated from Istanbul under President Erdogan’s protection until 2022. Mekameleen ceased operations after Turkey-Egypt rapprochement, the fate of the remaining outlets is unkown These outlets openly aimed “to restore an MB regime in Egypt” and do so “by resorting to extremist, jihadist and antisemitic discourse.”. A Stockholm think-tank recently observed that an Istanbul-based group (IOSPI) tied to the Brotherhood was explicitly recruiting followers for Erdogan’s Islamist proxies and even “exporting radical Islamist ideology — at times endorsing violence and armed jihad in the name of religion“. In practice, MB media in Turkey regularly air speeches by hardline clerics and broadcast pro-jihadist messages, enjoying freedoms not available to secular or moderate voices in Turkey. (By contrast, local secular media in Turkey have faced censorship under Erdogan.) In sum, Turkey provides MB-affiliated networks a powerful broadcast platform: one analysis summarized that Islamist exiles “operate freely under Erdogan’s regime,” using Turkish-based channels to propagate a militant Islamist agenda across the region.
- Egypt and North Africa: The Brotherhood’s digital opposition is strongest against Egypt’s military-led regime. Exiled Brotherhood leaders (often based in Turkey or Qatar) use satellite TV and social media to challenge Cairo. For example, Brotherhood-linked media circulated video allegations that Egyptian forces killed MB supporters – claims widely disputed but intended to undermine Sisi’s legitimacy. In Tunisia and Libya, local Islamist parties with MB roots (like Ennahda in Tunisia) also ran online campaigns.
In all these countries, MB propaganda is unapologetically sectarian and political. As the Stanford report noted, its “Facebook Page names were direct and unsubtle,” often invoking regional crises (e.g. “Tunisia Against the UAE”, “YemenAgainstKSAUEA”).
The messaging stressed a narrative of Muslim unity against Western or secular enemies, aligning with allied rulers. Videos and songs would depict MB-supported presidents as heroes, while labeling their foes as villains or infidels. Social media amplification techniques—like zombie pages, artificial trending, and bot-like behavior—give the false impression of mass popular support.
These tactics aim to shape public opinion (especially among Arabs and Turks) and to rally Muslims behind Brotherhood causes.
Critics argue the Brotherhood’s offline and online propaganda often overlaps with that of designated extremist groups. A MENA-region research center bluntly described the MB’s lobbying networks as “the intellectual and ideological incubator for all jihadist groups,” accusing them of using Europe’s free environment to spread propaganda and avoid scrutiny.
It is clear the MB’s digital arm communicates in a highly ideological tone, most times glorifying martyrdom or sharia, and thus feeding narratives that can appeal to radicals. In Turkish-run Brotherhood media, for instance, sermons calling for armed jihad have gone uncensored.
However, since the 2013 ouster of Egypt’s Mohamed Morsi, nearly every Arab-world government that once offered the Muslim Brotherhood formal political power has either collapsed or been forced underground. Cairo outlawed the movement as a “terrorist organisation” in December 2013 and has jailed thousands of its cadres since then.
Tunisia’s Ennahda lost its parliamentary majority in 2021 and has been bludgeoned by mass arrests ahead of the 2025 vote, leaving its senior leaders in prison or exile. Jordan went further this April, issuing a blanket ban on the Brotherhood, shuttering its offices and criminalising membership. Libya’s Justice & Construction Party is hobbled by factional war, and in Turkey the Brotherhood survives only as a media-in-exile network that depends on AK Party patronage rather than its own grassroots base.
Against that backdrop, Sudan’s “Islamic Movement” (the local Brotherhood franchise) has rebounded to become the organisation’s strongest operational stronghold outside Qatar.
Reuters and independent think-tank studies show that thousands of Bashir-era intelligence officers and Islamist loyalists are now fighting alongside General al-Burhan’s army (SAF), while the movement’s civilian wing—led by former foreign minister Ali Karti—controls charities, businesses and patronage funds that survived the 2019 revolution.
This alliance gives the Brotherhood something it lacks elsewhere: direct leverage over a national army, parts of the civil service and significant wartime budgets.
The Gaza Strip is a partial exception—Hamas, an offshoot of the Brotherhood, still wields de facto authority there—but its enclave status, international isolation and the ongoing war with Israel sharply limit its regional reach.
By contrast, Port Sudan SAF junta’s Islamists influence national policy, steer battlefield narratives through a well-resourced cyber-operation, and broker funding from sympathetic Gulf networks. In simple terms, Sudan is now the only place where the Brotherhood simultaneously commands guns, bureaucrats and a country-wide messaging machine.
Muslim Brotherhood In Sudan
Sudanese students inspired by Hassan al-Banna set up the first Brotherhood cells in the 1940s, but the movement truly embedded itself when Hassan al-Turabi welded local Islamist currents into the National Islamic Front (NIF) and helped Omar al-Bashir seize power in 1989.
From that point on, “the Islamic Movement” (the umbrella label the Brotherhood prefers inside Sudan) held portfolios in government, business, and—crucially—the security services. Even after Bashir’s ouster in 2019, senior Islamists such as ex-foreign-minister Ali Karti regrouped and, in September 2024, rolled out a “Broad Islamic Current” that folds two Brotherhood factions into a single bloc explicitly backing General al-Burhan’s forces (SAF) against the RSF.
The digital shock troops: NISS Cyber-Jihad Unit
To police dissent and pump regime messaging, Bashir’s intelligence agency created a “Cyber-Jihadist Unit” in 2011. It combined censorship tools with coordinated social-media influence operations—a template the post-Bashir Islamists still draw on.
Comeback in the civil-war era (2023-25)
- Manpower on the front line. Reuters estimates about 6,000 ex-intelligence officers and Islamist loyalists are now fighting alongside the SAF; their commanders pitch the war as a defence of “identity and religion.”
- Auxiliary militias. One of the most visible is the SAF-aligned Bara’a Ibn Malik Battalion, widely linked to the Brotherhood and filmed singing militant anthems while calling for “jihad” against the RSF.
How the propaganda machine works
- Hashtag storms & botnets. Digital-forensics group Valent Projects found that just 5 % of pro-SAF accounts—many created during the 2019 uprising—generated most traffic for slogans such as “We are all the army,” a classic astroturf pattern.
- Narrative control. Brotherhood-linked outlets recycle old footage, declare phantom victories and smear civilian resistance committees; Assayha’s March 2025 investigation dubbed it “the biggest deception scheme of the Sudan war.”
- Co-ordinated inauthentic behaviour. Beam Reports mapped multiple CIB networks that copy-paste ready-made replies, recycle mosque sermons as viral audio, and inject Gaza/Hamas hashtags to cast SAF operations as part of a global Islamist struggle.
Information-warfare toolbox
| Tactic | Example | Intended effect |
|---|---|---|
| “Battle of Dignity” and “Rapid Support Terrorist Militia” hashtags | Pushed by SAF-aligned Telegram channels | Elevate army patriotism; delegitimise RSF |
| Deep-fake martyr videos | Circulated after RSF gains in Khartoum | Sustain morale; recruit volunteers |
| Telegram “swarm” channels | Distribute pre-written Quran-laced replies | Make Islamist framing ubiquitous |
| Diaspora micro-influencers in Qatar & Turkey | Paid to post Arabic-language threads praising Burhan | Shape Gulf public opinion & funding flows |
The Brotherhood’s Sudan chapter blends boots on the ground with a decades-old propaganda apparatus that is now supercharged by social-media CIB networks.
The result is a narrative environment where civilian voices are drowned out, extremist rhetoric is normalised, and jihadist recruitment pipelines—already flagged by U.S. intelligence—can flourish again.
In 2025 the Brotherhood’s Sudan branch (“the Islamic Movement”) is the only one—outside exile-friendly Qatar—that still has:
| Gauge of sway | Sudan | Turkey | Libya | Jordan/Tunisia/Egypt |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hard power inside a regular army or security service | Thousands of Bashir-era intelligence officers and Islamist loyalists now fight with the General al-Burhan’s army (SAF). | None; MB exiles rely on AKP patronage, not the Turkish military | No direct grip on Libyan National Army or rival forces | None (movements banned or dismantled) |
| Political umbrella | The “Broad Islamic Current” led by ex-foreign minister Ali Karti openly backs SAF and claims to speak for all Islamist factions. | Informal influence through Erdogan-aligned NGOs like IOSPI, but no MB party in parliament. | Justice & Construction Party holds seats but civil-war paralysis limits reach. | Legal status revoked (Jordan April 23 ban; Tunisia’s Ennahda repressed; Egypt outlawed since 2013). |
| Control of information space | SAF-aligned “Cyber-Jihad” networks run coordinated hashtag storms, deep-fake martyr videos, and mosque-sermon bots to frame the war as an Islamist jihad. (See Beam Reports, Valent Projects findings summarised earlier.) | Istanbul is a content hub, but operations target third countries more than Turkey itself. | Competing militias and external patrons crowd out one MB narrative. | Tight state censorship plus crackdowns leave little online room. |
| Territory/governance | SAF still administers large swaths of northern & eastern Sudan and the federal bureaucracy, giving MB cadres a budget, weapons and patronage channels. | No territorial control; influence is rhetorical/diplomatic. | Fragmented authority; MB presence limited to some municipal councils. | None. |
Sudan edges out other arenas because its Islamists sit inside the chain of command, directing battlefield strategy, civil-service appointments and war spending—clout their Turkish and Libyan counterparts can only dream of. The 2023-25 conflict has also handed the Islamic Movement a potent rallying narrative, portraying the SAF’s fight against the RSF as a defence of “faith and identity” that fuels volunteer recruitment and Gulf fundraising.
And with Western capitals distracted and the Gulf split, no coordinated outside pressure has emerged to squeeze the Sudanese Brotherhood the way Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have throttled their own branches. Caveats remain: Istanbul is still the safest rear base for exiled clerics, think tanks and Arabic-language media; Qatar quietly supplies the money and diplomatic cover; and Libya, Yemen and Kuwait each host pockets of parliamentary or militia influence.
Yet none of those settings combine guns, bureaucracy and unified leadership the way Sudan now does, making it the Brotherhood’s most powerful stronghold beyond Qatar.
The Brotherhood’s Western Playbook
In contrast, the Brotherhood’s operations in Western democracies look quite different. Here, MB-aligned groups tend to present themselves as moderate community organizations or defenders of Muslims’ rights.
Their messaging often invokes democratic values — ironically, to advance illiberal goals. Key patterns in the West include:
- Exploiting democratic freedoms: Europe and North America provide MB affiliates legal space and funding (via liberal NGO grants and protected speech). A detailed critique from 2022 notes that the Brotherhood has “exploited the climate of freedoms to spread propaganda, misinformation and media campaigns,” often hiding behind accusations of Islamophobia to deflect criticism. Essentially, Western governments’ tolerance for political Islamism has allowed MB-linked organizations to operate front groups (mosque associations, student groups, charities) that no local party could. In the UK, for example, dozens of groups (ranging from community centers to relief charities) have been linked by analysts to the Brotherhood network. Under the banner of integration or civic participation, MB operatives often cultivate relationships with mainstream politicians. The same MENA report warns that in Britain the Brotherhood “took full advantage” of democratic openness, building a system of some 60 institutions and investments in everything from schools to businesses. While the truth of the estimated “$8–10 billion” of MB assets in the UK is debatable, it illustrates the scale at which the Brotherhood has embedded itself using Western institutions.
- Lobbying and “entryism” in politics: In Europe, leaked government analyses say MB-linked actors have sought to influence policymakers and lawmaking. A May 2025 Politico report on a leaked French security study states that Brotherhood-affiliated lobbyists pressured EU bodies to “criminalize blasphemy” and enforce a “singular” vision of religious freedom—policies at odds with France’s strict secularism. The report noted that they “particularly targeted” European Parliament members. In plain language, MB-aligned NGOs in Brussels have been accused of pushing for Islamist-friendly laws under the guise of human rights. Similarly, British analysts in 2014 noted the MB’s philosophy “runs counter to British values of democracy, the rule of law, [and] individual liberty,” despite its local operatives claiming to uphold those ideals. While the UK government ultimately chose not to ban the Brotherhood outright, it commissioned official reviews and cautioned about “an ideology that potentially conflicts with core British values.”
- Framing issues as Islamophobia and rights: A common tactic is to present any critique of the Brotherhood or its allied regimes as an attack on Muslims. For example, the leaked French report accused MB networks of advancing their agenda “under the guise of combatting Islamophobia.” It even cited an Arabic slogan in Europe (“Freedom is in the hijab”) as evidence of MB influence. In practice, Brotherhood-linked media will highlight any negative coverage of Islamist parties or foreign governments (e.g. Turkish or Qatari media in Europe) and reframe it as bigotry. They lobby for “religious freedom” clauses that, critics say, really aim to protect Sharia practice. In Belgium and France, it was reported that MB-affiliated entities used grants from Brussels’ cultural funds to push narratives aligning with Qatar or Turkey, and to defame Gulf rivals (e.g. UAE) for “human rights abuses” to undermine those governments’ image.
- Social media campaigns in the West: The Brotherhood and its allies do engage social platforms abroad, though often more subtly. One case illustrates their playbook: In 2022 a Saudi-funded news site (Arab News) revealed that an Islamist website called “Shuoun Islamiya” was circulating false videos accusing Sweden of “kidnapping” Muslim children. Swedish officials condemned this as an orchestrated campaign: ironically, the site partnered with a fringe Turkish-origin party in Sweden to amplify the hoax. The motive was to sow fear in immigrant communities and portray Europe as hostile to Islam. (Interestingly, this site’s content pushed Brotherhood-friendly figures as the saviors of Muslim rights.) According to the investigation, Shuoun Islamiya’s Twitter and Telegram channels “push and promote Muslim Brotherhood salafists and loyalists”. In short, Brotherhood-aligned actors abroad sometimes weaponize sensational “news” – especially about Islamophobia or social crises – to rally Muslims and pressure Western societies.
- Influence operations via proxies: The Brotherhood’s reach in the West is also extended by allied ideologues. For example, a well-known case is that Islamist activists from North Africa (linked to the Brotherhood’s Tunisian branch) have used European social media to wage influence campaigns. A 2025 BBC exposé on Tunisia noted that hundreds of Twitter accounts based in the Gulf were trending pro-government hashtags to smear Tunisia’s secular president as an enemy of Islam. While this example was chiefly Gulf-run, it shows the environment in which Brotherhood propaganda operates: by working with like-minded states (Qatar, Turkey) and Islamist media personalities in Europe, MB networks gain wider amplification of their messages. Notably, even the Gulf monarchies’ own campaigns admit to constantly fighting the Brotherhood through disinformation (for example targeting Morocco, Tunisia, and Muslim activists worldwide).
In summary, the Brotherhood’s Western strategy is more about influence than overt seizure of power. It lobbies quietly in parliaments and universities, funds friendly charities, and uses legal channels to advocate causes (e.g. defending religious dress or criticizing countries like Egypt/UAE).
It never has to claim direct credit for a campaign; it only needs to seed talking points. The focus is on long-term “soft power.” Western governments and analysts increasingly warn that MB affiliates exploit Western tolerance to build sympathy for authoritarian Islamist goals.
For instance, a recent French report bluntly stated that while the Brotherhood “gave a Western look to the ideology” in Europe, it still aims to “lay down the roots of [Middle Eastern] tradition” concealed as reform.
In practice, that means stressing “freedom, democracy, and coexistence” in speeches, while privately pursuing an Islamist vision of society.
Contrasting Approaches: MENA vs. Western Targets
The Brotherhood’s digital tactics thus differ sharply by audience:
- In Muslim-majority or regional contexts: Campaigns are overtly Islamist and political. They openly signal their identity (names like “Muslims for Erdogan”, or religious slogans). The messaging centers on jihadist ideas, sectarian narratives (Sunni vs. infidel/Shia), and support for authoritarian allies. Videos and posts mock secularism and democracy as “Western plots,” and call for Islamic governance. The Brotherhood does not shy away from activism on social media: it encourages protests, highlights Islamist martyrs, and uses local languages. For example, its Turkish channels routinely stoke anti-Israel sentiment and praise Hamas; its Arabic pages celebrate coups by Islamists or promote narratives of Muslim persecution by rival states. Researchers note they use very direct propaganda: one analysis found Brotherhood network pages with names like “Tunisia against the UAE” or “Yemen versus KSA/UAE”, leaving little doubt about their ideological stance. In effect, these campaigns aim to polarize and mobilize Middle Eastern audiences around Islamist ideology.
- In Western democracies: Campaigns are covert and ideological. Brotherhood actors typically do not claim to be the Brotherhood, and the content rarely mentions Islamist slogans or sharia explicitly. Instead they frame issues as universal (freedom, anti-racism, religious rights). The aim is to normalize Islamist perspectives. For example, leaked policy documents say MB affiliates have used “freedom of religion” slogans to push policies friendly to Islamist governments, or have opposed secular laws by invoking “multiculturalism.” They also emphasize Islamophobia (accusing critics of bigotry) to muzzle investigation. Media manipulation here often uses disinformation only as a backdrop (e.g. using fake news stories to create sympathy), rather than the sharp partisan messaging seen in the Middle East. In the West the Brotherhood’s goal is not to overthrow governments but to infiltrate the conversation: recruiting supporters, influencing elections (by mobilizing Muslim voters), and shaping perceptions of foreign policy (for example, urging Western support for Islamist movements abroad).
Examples of Disinformation Campaigns
Several concrete campaigns illustrate these tactics:
- MB-aligned Social Media Networks (2020): As noted above, Facebook’s own reports confirmed dismantling of a large MB-linked network in late 2020. That network (Egypt/Turkey/Morocco) was openly targeting regional audiences on political issues. This was part of a pattern: earlier in 2018–19, both Facebook and Twitter took down multiple MB-associated accounts in MENA for “coordinated inauthentic behavior.” Although such takedowns are often opaque, investigative outlets (like the Stanford lab and DFRLab) have clearly identified MB involvement in these operations.
- Hijacking Local Conflicts: In 2022 the Arab News exposé of the “Sweden kidnapping” hoax (above) showed how a Brotherhood-friendly media outlet co-opted a local European controversy. By spreading fabricated stories about Muslim children being mistreated, the site fueled outrage and complicated Swedish politics – all to advance a narrative of Western oppression that fits the Brotherhood’s worldview. This tactic (coordinating with fringe local groups to spread conspiracy narratives via social media) is not unique to the Brotherhood, but the key point is that it masqueraded as a Muslim advocacy campaign, hiding any reference to MB.
- Influence in EU Institutions (2024–25): Recent leaks from French and EU intelligence underscore the Brotherhood’s Western strategies. A French security report leaked to Politico in 2025 warned that MB-linked associations had been quietly lobbying EU legislators. They allegedly pressed for criminalizing blasphemy and for a narrow interpretation of religious freedom (policies aligned with fundamentalist vision). The European Parliament was “particularly targeted,” the report claimed. In practice, this means some Brussels-funded advocacy groups – often set up by Arab states or exiles – have acted as Brotherhood proxies. Although the evidence is politically contested, the allegations reveal how the MB tries to use Brussels’ open system to sway decisions.
- UK Networks (2014–Present): The UK illustrates the difficulty of addressing MB influence. A 2014 government review concluded that while many Islamists in Britain are well-intentioned, some MB-inspired groups “raise enough concern” that certain Islamist ideologies are incompatible with British values. However, the review stopped short of banning the Brotherhood or its affiliates on domestic soil. More recently, allied governments have weighed in: in early 2024 the United Arab Emirates (a firm MB adversary) sanctioned eight UK-based Muslim organizations and 11 individuals for alleged MB ties. This was an unusual step (EU partner sanctioning entities in the UK) and prompted a brief media stir. It underscores that even pro-Western Islamist groups in Britain are viewed with suspicion by regional powers – yet in the UK itself these groups continue to operate openly. The Brotherhood’s UK strategy seems to be patience and engagement: front organizations recruit young professionals and students, attend interfaith dialogues, and fund mosque schools. Analysts note that parliamentary inquiries have repeatedly asked MI5 and the Foreign Office to assess Brotherhood links to community centers and foreign-funded charities.
- Academic and Think Tank Studies: Independent researchers have also catalogued MB propaganda networks. One 2021 study of Arabic Twitter during Middle Eastern crises (published by the International Journal of Communication) detailed how MB-affiliated “electronic committees” organize disinformation to bolster Islamist leaders. For example, “in the aftermath of the assassination of a Hamas official in Beirut (Feb 2020), MB-linked social media accounts shared unverified narratives to radicalize the discourse.” While academic journals often avoid overt partisanship, such studies affirm that disinformation and rumor-mongering are tools of ideological mobilization in the Arab world – and that the Brotherhood has neither shied away from them nor disavowed them.
The evidence paints a clear picture: the Muslim Brotherhood has been a sophisticated player in the social media disinformation arena for over a decade. It has built cross-border networks that mimic the style of state propaganda machines, and it uses them strategically.
In the Muslim-majority world, Brotherhood-backed accounts churn out explicitly Islamist messaging to support its allies and undermine its enemies. In Western countries, Brotherhood-aligned organizations deftly wrap their messaging in democratic and human-rights language, even as they quietly advance a polarizing Islamist agenda.
This dual approach – naked ideological warfare at home, and subtle influence in the West – helps explain why the Brotherhood remains so resilient despite military defeats on the ground. Its digital footprint is global.
By posing as advocates of democracy in Europe and as defenders of Islam in the Middle East, the Brotherhood leverages two very different narratives to serve the same ultimate goal: the spread of its brand of Islamism.
Understanding these tactics – from the fake Facebook pages of 2020 to the hijab-rights campaigns of today – is essential. Only by exposing the Brotherhood’s disinformation strategies can policymakers and the public challenge them effectively.
Sources: Contemporary research reports and journalism document these patterns. For example, Stanford researchers and Meta’s own transparency reports detail Brotherhood-linked disinformation networks; Western media coverage of leaked security reports illuminates Brotherhood influence efforts in Europe; and regional analyses (e.g. by MEMRI and Gulf-funded think tanks) highlight MB-run media from Turkey and its ideological messaging.
Collectively these sources provide a factual basis for understanding the Brotherhood’s digital influence campaign, exposing how it adapts its tactics to authoritarian and liberal contexts alike.
